We apply a Public-Private Benefit Framework (PPBF) for new perspectives on the distributional consequences of land-use change in upstream watersheds (wide expansion of tree plantations) negatively affecting downstream water users. Our study area is the Macquarie River catchment in central-west New South Wales, as part of Australia's Murray-Darling Basin, where active water entitlement markets exist downstream. We consider benefits and costs to private upstream landholders allowed to establish new plantations without regard to reduced water flows and qualities to downstream users (urban, agricultural and environmental). Second, we explore a policy requiring new plantations to purchase permanent entitlements in advance for amounts of water they will divert from downstream uses; the calculated increase in evapotranspiration above that of current land-use. With no requirement to purchase entitlements, new plantation areas and their increased water consumption would be greatest, as would negative impacts on downstream water users. Some downstream water users are assumed willing to surrender entitlements at lower prices than others, resulting in an upward-sloping supply curve. Demand for entitlements by new upstream plantations will be functions of anticipated tree product yields, prices, establishment and opportunity costs. Their aggregate demand is downward sloping and intersects the supply curve to define the equilibrium quantity and price of water entitlements traded. With a tree product price of $70/m 3 the economic consequences of unrestricted expansion of planting in the upper watersheds could be in the order of $639M (tree-NPV, 7%) in upstream private net benefit gains, but $388M in uncompensated losses to downstream public net benefits, counting losses of 154 GL in environmental flows valued at $1M/GL, for total catchment net benefits of $251M. The policy as confirmed by our PPBF, indicates "flexible negative incentives" to reduce the expansion of new private plantations by compensating downstream public losses through sale of water entitlements from the latter to the former. Assuming that environmental flows are protected and purchase of downstream water entitlements is required from irrigators and stock and domestic users for new tree plantations, net private benefits of $192M to new plantations are added to $138M in downstream public benefits, improving the net change in catchment benefits to $330M. The policy would improve total net catchment benefit from $251M to $330M, achieving an economically efficient, socially equitable and environmentally sustainable solution, which adjusts automatically over time through the market. Crown
USA, were among the first finding reduced water yields of forested catchments in comparison with paired cleared catchments. Wood (1924) is credited as the first to document observations on local increases in stream flows and salinity following destruction of native vegetation in Australia. A study on safeguarding water supplies in South Africa (Wicht, 1967) appeared at the same meeting as did a landmark review of forest treatment effects on water yields by Hibbert (1967) who summarised scientific results from 39 catchments around the world.
Many subsequent studies on catchment water yields were conducted to understand local problems, from flooding to stream water shortages. In 2001, Zhang, Dawes and Walker published their analyses of reported results from a data set of 250 catchments world-wide, quantifying the effects of vegetation changes on average annual catchment water balances. A further analytic review of changes in annual water yield from afforestation, deforestation and regrowth in 94 paired catchment experiments cited by Bosch and Hewlett (1982) and an additional 72 from various sources, is reported by Brown et al. (2005) . This complemented the results of Zhang et al. (2001) by showing that deforestation experiments reach new (higher) equilibrium water yields in fewer years than afforestation experiments reach new (lower) equilibrium yields. Brown et al. (2005) also showed "under afforestation, conifers used more water than hardwoods or eucalypts."
Relatively few studies have combined economic investigations to consider costs and benefits of catchment vegetation and water yield changes as they impact on downstream populations. In Fiji, planting of pines in the catchment for a new hydropower reservoir was observed to reduce water levels, resulting in chronic shortfalls in power generation for the capital city (Drysdale, 1982) . Shuhuai et al. (2001) report protection of Beijing's municipal water supply by cancellation of a proposed plan for pine plantations in its catchment.
Several recent studies have focussed specifically on the economic trade-offs between producing carbon credits or water yields from catchments where water yields are valued Farley et al., 2005; Schrobback et al., 2011; Polglase et al., 2013) . Nordblom et al. (2006 Nordblom et al. ( , 2009 Nordblom et al. ( , 2010 Nordblom et al. ( , 2011 Nordblom et al. ( , 2012a have studied the economics of catchment water sharing among timber production, urban, agricultural and wetland uses under different rules. Jackson et al. (2005) , Schrobback et al. (2011) and Polglase et al., 2013 point out that carbon-sequestration strategies typically favour standing biomass in tree plantations without considering the full environmental and economic consequences, which often include dramatic reductions in water yield. The present paper does not distinguish between the two types of tree plantation.
Policy and regulation can influence distributions of ecosystem service flows among socio-economic and environmental interests. The purpose of this study is to illustrate how a Public-Private Benefit Framework (PPBF) can be used to inform policy discussions by clearly displaying the calculated trade-offs in consequences among different constituencies. We focus on the policy to require new high-rainfall tree plantations to compensate downstream water users for likely reductions in their water supply. Without such a policy, new tree plantations will avoid paying for external costs they impose on others. More profitable as a result, they can be expected to spread over larger areas, reducing stream flows, further affecting the downstream public adversely. The distributions of river flow volumes and qualities (ecosystem services), are affected by land uses in the main source watersheds and water demands for urban use, agricultural industry and wetland environmental assets. For illustration we take the case of the Macquarie Catchment in central NSW, which is a tributary to the Darling River in Australia's Murray-Darling Basin (MDB).
Lakes and wetland environments are valued in the MDB. Due to increased consumptive water use in the past century, the surface waters of the MDB are now quite fully allocated. Thus, relatively little (perhaps 1%) is allowed to be lost as flows from its outlet to the Southern Ocean (Grafton et al., 2014) . The competition for water use, which is the focus of the present paper, can be viewed as the question of the distribution of entitlements to intercept, divert, evaporate or otherwise consume basin water.
Increasing competition for water resources has focussed attention on policy development to manage the adverse consequence of landuse change as it affects water availability. In Australia, the recently introduced Murray-Darling Basin Plan (MDBA, 2012) has provisions for the development of water-resource plans that include management of water "interception activities," such as plantation forestry, as part of the management of the water cycle at a complete basin scale (MDBA, 2013) . The development of methods that integrate the physical sciences with a-priori socio-economic economic assessment of the consequences of the land-use changes will be required to assist with the successful implementation of these policies.
Water management in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB), Australia, is a topic of vital interest among communities whose livelihoods depend on its water volumes and quality, and the many who care about the biodiversity benefits of sustaining flows to wetland environments. Tree plantations are among the highest water users per hectare (ha) of any vegetative land cover (Prosser and Walker, 2009) and are most productive in the high-rainfall zones. Perennial pastures use less water per ha than trees, and annual pastures and crops require the least (Penman, 1963; Zhang et al., 2001; Evans et al., 2004; Marcar et al., 2010; Herron et al., 2002) . The MDB's high-rainfall zones are in the upper watersheds (sub-catchments), which feed streams flowing to the dryer plains where water is diverted for irrigated agriculture and for "stock and domestic" purposes, while also sustaining riparian environmental assets, such as the Macquarie Marshes Wetlands. Urban areas also depend upon river water directly or on groundwater, often recharged by surface water.
Here we demonstrate how the use of the Public-Private Benefit Framework (PPBF) of Pannell (2008) is appropriate for the task at hand. That is, to illuminate the distributional consequences of water policy options quantified in the case of a large New South Wales catchment (the Macquarie River valley in the MDB) by Nordblom et al. (2009 Nordblom et al. ( , 2011 Nordblom et al. ( , 2012a . Viewing these previously published results through the PPBF places them in new light for clearer interpretations. We quantify how increased values (prices) of tree-products affect the profitability and expansion of plantations in the higher-rainfall zones and impact upon downstream interests in stream volumes and water quality (salinity concentrations). We consider a policy where new tree plantations in the higher-rainfall watersheds are required to purchase permanent water entitlements (for the extra water that they will take) from those that hold entitlements downstream. We also explore impacts that could be expected if one of the watersheds (hypothetically) has such highly salty water yields that reductions in fresh flows from the other watersheds could result in river salinity concentrations that fail human health standards for urban water users.
In the southeast corner of South Australia, land owners wishing to establish tree plantations must first obtain permanent water entitlements from downstream water users (DEWNR, 2013) . This is an example of settling an externality conflict in resource uses with an expanded definition of property rights in water, and a water market to reach flexible balances.
Results of earlier studies providing much of the quantitative data used in the present paper have been published elsewhere; these with the methods used to simulate the Macquarie River's water economy and interactions among the various sectors are briefly described in Section 2. Section 3 develops an upstream-downstream benefit adaptation of the PPBF (Pannell, 2008) , which is applied to evaluate the economic impacts of a policy requiring new plantations to obtain water entitlements to offset estimated reductions in stream volumes. Consequences of the policy under four levels of tree-product prices, and subsidisation of salinity-mitigating plantations, which affect demand for water entitlements, are examined. Section 4 focuses on the likely consequences of the policy, given caveats on the present work and promising paths toward improved future analyses. Section 5 concludes.
Methods
This paper integrates the results of analyses done by the authors and others elsewhere as cited, with the aim of showing that these detailed findings can be interpreted more intuitively and fully using the graphical approach of a Public-Private Benefit Framework (PPBF). This can provide straightforward views of the trade-offs under the different policies among competing interests in the access to limited water volumes and quality. The two main policy options are whether to require new plantations to purchase water entitlements or to ignore the expansion of new tree plantations in the high rainfall areas, and the subsequent reduction in long-term water supply, leaving this to be sorted out among current downstream water entitlement holders in the urban, agricultural, stock & domestic sectors and the publicly-managed wetlands.
Measures and data
We employ a common measure for water volumes used and traded: the gigalitre (GL), which is equal to one million cubic metres (10 6 m 3 ) or 1000 megalitres (ML). 1 GL of water is sufficient to cover an area of 100 ha or 1 km 2 to a depth of 1 m.
Australia's MDB is one of the longest river systems in the world and one of the driest (MDBA, 2015) . With a surface area of over one million km 2 it receives mean annual rainfalls totalling some 500,000 GL (500 km 3 ). Most of this goes off as evaporation and evapotranspiration from the vast areas of low-relief terrain where it falls, with its rangelands and sown pastures, dryland and irrigated cropping, native and planted forest and wetland vegetation, yielding on average some 23,500 GL (b5%) as runoff to surface streams (Kendall, 2005) .
The data used here were mainly sourced from the results of Nordblom et al. (2009) which focussed on land and water uses in the Macquarie River catchment under 16 combinations of policy, price and salinity settings. Subsets of these settings are subjected to further analyses in the present paper. Schematic maps of our study area are given in Fig. 1 (adapted from Nordblom et al., 2009 Nordblom et al., , 2012a to lay out the initial conditions against which simulated changes are measured.
In Fig. 1 we define six watersheds (three with 600 mm annual rainfalls, and one each with 700, 800 and 1000 mm) where new tree plantations could be established, and four downstream categories of water consumers (urban water and other high-security users, irrigation industries, "stock and domestic" water users, and wetland environments) that would be affected by reduced river flows.
Of the three mid-catchment watersheds (Fig. 1) , only the final watershed (MCD) joins the river downstream of the urban and other high-security water use sector (UHS), which is sensitive to salinity concentrations higher than 500 ppm (parts per million). The other water-use sectors are relatively insensitive to salinity, but may instead be constrained by limits on their access to water in a water-sharing market where the total supply is determined by river flows from the watersheds and, ultimately, by rainfall.
Most common among Australian timber plantation species is the fast-growing conifer, Pinus radiata, which uses more water per hectare than eucalypts or hardwoods (Brown et al., 2005) . The present study assumes that new plantations will be P. radiata. Nordblom et al. (2009 Nordblom et al. ( , 2012a use economic analysis to build upon this physical and biological foundation, to develop both aggregate catchment ( Fig. 2) and disaggregated subsector by subsector results (Fig. 3) .
The aggregate results in Fig. 2 define the prices and total volumes of water traded to upstream tree plantations. At $60 and $70/m 3 stumpage values, market solutions indicate trade of 47 and 90/GL of water entitlements, respectively, from downstream sectors to upstream watersheds (Nordblom et al., 2009 (Nordblom et al., , 2012a . Notice the equilibrium water price of $1.89M/GL for the higher demand and 90/GL of trade induced by the higher tree-product price of $70/m 3 (Fig. 2) . Coincidently, a similar price ($1.96M/GL for 2009) was estimated by Dixon et al. (2012, p. 117 ) using a computable generalised equilibrium (CGE) model for a prospective government programme to "buy back" water from irrigators in the southern MDB aimed to increase river flows for the environment. In principle, it may appear not to matter to irrigators whether they give up some water to the government for the downstream environment or to private land owners in the upstream watersheds wishing to establish new tree plantations. However, once an upstream plantation is established, it uses water at evapotranspiration rates that increase with tree maturity and rainfall levels. Runoff and river flows may be expected to measurably decline from watersheds hosting new plantations until the trees have matured (at 30 years or more), then continue at the lower flows until harvest. Only after harvesting will there be a return to the higher-flows seen prior to plantation establishment. Replanting and vigorous regrowth will again reduce water yields. Changes in watershed water yields, downstream water-use volumes, economic surpluses, and salt concentrations faced by the urban and high-security consumers (UHS), were simulated with reference to water yield and use data from Beale et al. (2000) based on records for 1975-1995, as detailed in Nordblom et al. (2009) .
Results depend on marginal values of water; how changes in water volumes and qualities are valued by each of the 10 water-use sectors mentioned above (including water-use for tree plantations in six watersheds). That is, how much a 1 GL increment in water quantity may be worth to a particular sector, and what the opportunity cost is for that sector to face a decrement of 1 GL in access to water. Marginal value curves for water were approximated for each of the 10 sectors (Nordblom et al., 2009 (Nordblom et al., , 2011 . It was assumed that the opportunity costs of giving up a hectare of a prior land-use in a watershed subcatchment to make room for a tree plantation is directly related to the profitability of that prior use (highest on good crop land, lower on land under perennial pastures, lowest on annual pastures; with the latter representing the greater proportion of land-use, and the former the least). Rough land areas hosting remnant forest vegetation were considered unsuited for new tree plantations. Initial proportions of land-use were assumed to be the same as those estimated for one of the watersheds, MCUS (Little River in Nordblom et al., 2006; Finlayson et al., 2010) .
In addition to the opportunity costs in changing land-use to a tree plantation are the direct costs of land preparation, planting and protecting the trees for the 30 years until harvest. It is assumed that the marginal value of the increased water use by a plantation over that of the prior use is a direct function of the stumpage value paid to the owner at harvest, say between $40 and $70/m 3 of tree-product, minus the opportunity costs and direct costs over the years until harvest. Tree growth is directly tied to rainfall; least under 600 mm rainfalls and best in the higher rainfall watersheds. Water interception (evapotranspiration) by trees also increases predictably with annual rainfall. We assumed continuing and constant rainfalls at the long-term annual average levels specific to the different watersheds of the catchment.
Economic relationships
Such simplifications allow complex impacts to be demonstrated clearly regarding water availabilities for downstream sectors due to changes in land-use in the six watersheds. For example, with the above information, we can express the net present value of the benefits of extra water use by new plantations in $/GL terms, as a decreasing function of extra water use by plantations in a given watershed, as trees are planted first in parts of a watershed where they will be most profitable, and last on parts of the catchment that trees are not financially viable. This is a curved line of marginal values of extra water use by new plantations in a watershed (Nordblom et al., 2009) . It is taken as a watershed's demand curve for such extra water use, representing the upper limits of water value that prospective tree planters would expect for increments in water use. Horizontally summing all the curved water demand curves produces the wavy aggregate demand curves shown in Fig. 2 . These measures of water value provide a key link with the existing downstream water market among irrigators, stock and domestic water users, urban and even wetland water uses. If new plantations are not liable to compensate downstream water entitlement holders for reductions in their water supply, then we assume that new plantation areas will expand to the point in each watershed where their private opportunity costs and direct costs are covered by some margin with the discounted income expected at some tree-product price and harvested quantity.
In contrast, if new plantations face the additional cost of purchasing downstream water entitlements, we can expect much smaller areas of new plantation establishment, limited in the aggregate to the water quantity and price agreeable with the downstream water market. That is, the new aggregate price and quantity equilibrium point is found where the aggregate supply curve of water entitlements crosses the relevant aggregate demand curve (Nordblom et al., 2009 ).
All watershed sectors are expected to expand tree plantations with higher tree-product prices if the extra water they use is free to them (that is, downstream losses are uncompensated). However, only the highest rainfall watersheds (UC10 and UC8) are motivated to plant many new trees if they must first obtain water entitlements. In the "with policy" scenarios, however, all sectors either benefit from gains in economic surplus or suffer no losses ( Fig. 3 and Table 1 ). For the sake of brevity, we have avoided including any detailed sensitivity analyses. Of course, a lower discount rate for future tree harvests will magnify the apparent value of a plantation. A higher discount rate will diminish the present value. It is assumed that individual private investors will follow their own ideas on discount rates.
Both catchment-wide aggregate and watershed and sector presentations of quantitative theoretical expectations of sector-by-sector results above reveal new insights. These include indications of which among the sectors are likely to gain or lose water (and/or money) given particular combinations of prices, salinity and policy. In the detailed results of Fig. 3 , watershed-by-watershed level comparisons are clear. Aggregated watershed values may be better suited for comparisons with the other sectors. Otherwise, the reader would need to sum across watersheds for each tree-product value node (see legend at the bottom of Fig. 3 ). In the FRESH case of water throughout the catchment, we assume that the flows to urban and other high-security water entitlement holders (UHS) are unaffected by the actions of other sectors. Information on the SALTY scenarios, where UHS is affected, is provided in Table 1 . UHS is assumed willing to purchase environmental services in the form of tree plantations in MCUS to reduce salt flows to the otherwise fresh river which supplies urban water. The key points of water quality in the present paper are in the management of river salinity, which becomes a threat to the urban water supply only when flows from a very salty watershed blend with reduced fresh water flows, where large areas of the fresh watershed have been planted to trees. Our 'causal model' is presented in FRESH-SALTY categories in Table 1 , in the map (Fig. 1 ) and in the distinctions in Figs. 6 and 7. For the sake of simplicity, we have ignored pesticide and fertilizer run-off issues.
The current study considers four main sectors:
(1) Watersheds, comprise six water-source areas (UC10, UC8, UC6, MCUS, MCU and MCD) mainly used for grazing of annual and perennial pastures, some cropping on bottom lands; remnant forest, State Forest and some private plantations are there; areas of grazing land are capable of hosting further profitable private tree plantations under favourable economic conditions. These watersheds supply the downstream Public sectors: (2) UHS, urban and other high-security users; (3) IRR+S&D, irrigation industry with rural "stock and domestic" water users; and (4) WL, wetland environmental assets.
We use Pannell's (2008) PPBF to show the consequences of policy changes under different tree-product prices and salinity conditions. A simple example of the basic logic of this form of presentation of policy choices is given in Fig. 4 (see http://dpannell.fnas.uwa.edu.au/ppf.htm for further examples). Of course, new projects and policy ideas are (Nordblom et al., 2009 (Nordblom et al., , 2012a . The Without policy and With policy values shown in these charts correspond to the "without and with policy" scenarios given FRESH conditions. See Fig. 1 for names of watersheds and downstream sectors. usually hoped to produce benefits for all parties, or at least benefit most and harm none, but this is not always the case. "The set of potential projects that would generate positive net benefits overall consists of those projects that fall in areas A, B and C" of Fig. 4 (Pannell, 2008) .
In the best cases, positive "win-win" benefits would locate a project in the north-east quadrant (area B) of the PPBF chart where positive Public net benefits are additive to positive Private net benefits. Area A represents projects in which increases in Public net benefits (on the vertical axis) exceed reductions in Private net benefits (on the horizontal axis); here, means may be justified for the Public to compensate those Private losses. In area C, the case at hand for the present paper, increases in Private benefits can outweigh reductions in Public net befits, so overall benefits are increased. For example, conversion of grazing land to a forestry plantation may be highly profitable to a Private landholder, but result in reduced flows of surface water into a stream, with offsite costs to downstream Public water users that are not sufficient to outweigh the on-site plantation benefits (Pannell, 2008) . Where the Public losses are negligible, it may be argued that no action is needed, based on the prospect of increased overall economic benefits. However, a realistic prospect of larger Public losses may justify establishing flexible negative incentives limiting the expansion of tree plantings. In cases where Private net benefits are exceeded by Public net losses, as in area D of the PPBF chart, overall benefits are reduced and negative incentives for expanding tree plantations may be justified.
Our present analysis categorises new commercial tree plantations as the Private sector, which aggregates individual best levels of new plantings (from the landowners' perspectives) in each of the six watersheds given four tree-product prices and no limits on water-use. These four Private net benefit values are then plotted against the responses of aggregate Public net benefits (or losses) by the downstream sectors: UHS, IRR+S&D and WL (wetland) water deficits. We assign a range of dollar values to the GL of water losses of WL to allow summing dollars across all downstream public sectors. The IRR and S&D and WL areas named in Fig. 1 were the source of quantified sector values combined to allow the aggregate analysis presented in Fig. 2 . The disaggregated watershed and sector results are determined from the calculations for Fig. 2 , explained in Nordblom et al. (2009) . The results are simultaneous across the catchment for each combination of tree-product value, salinity and policy setting, as decisions taken in the upstream private treeplanting sector affect all others, particularly when salinity management for UHS is an issue in the SALTY scenarios. The disaggregated simultaneous sector solutions could then be calculated in order to plot Fig. 3 . Measured from initial conditions regarding watershed yields and downstream water uses (listed in Fig. 1 ), estimated changes in water-use, economic surpluses and areas of new tree planting were calculated for Fig. 3 . That process is detailed in Nordblom et al. (2009) . Our present focus is on finding the conditions under which one might expect results that are "win-win" for both Private upstream tree plantations and downstream Public sectors (UHS, IRR+S&D and WL).
Four key divisions in the present study are the combinations of "without" or "with policy" to require water entitlements for new tree plantations, and the FRESH or SALTY scenarios. Results generated under each of these sets of conditions for the case of exogenous $70/m 3 tree-product values are listed in Table 1 . The values given in Table 1 for the FRESH Scenario Sets (1 and 3) correspond to those plotted at the $70/m 3 nodes in Fig. 3 , "without" and "with policy," respectively. In the SALTY scenarios, we assume that UHS offers a bonus of $2M/GL of salty water yield reduction from MCUS, calculated to just balance out reduced fresh dilution flows from the other watersheds. Trees would not be planted on salty patches in MCUS, but on its higher grounds to minimise water runoff and base-flow that would Sector names (defined in Fig. 1 otherwise reach the salty patches and mobilise salt, which would then seep into the fresh river system. We assume a 30-year rolling rotation of land preparation, planting, trimming and growth to harvest before replanting. Benefits and costs are expressed in discounted present value terms. Investments in afforestation of a high-rainfall area could imply the expectation of continuing future rainfalls. If purchases of water entitlements are required to compensate downstream interests for the anticipated reductions in streamflows caused, high priced water entitlements could lower the incentives for prospective afforestation to the point that no new forest plantations would be established except where high forest product prices were expected and in a few areas with the most favourable growing conditions.
Results
A PPBF chart is presented in Fig. 5 with the results of FRESH Scenario Set 1 from Table 1 Fig. 5 understates the possible environmental water losses which may also be of concern to the Public. The detailed downstream sector results of our "No Policy" Scenario Set 1 in Fig. 3 show large reductions in expected water flows to the WL and ECR due to extra water-use by new plantations driven by the elevated prices of tree-products. Fig. 6 , presents results for a range of values assigned to WL water losses. It also contrasts the FRESH and SALTY Scenarios (Sets 1 and 2), which depict results when water is taken by upstream private tree plantations without compensation to downstream water users. Fig. 6 suggests that prospects are not good for finding a "win-win" solution. Most of the results fall in area C of the PPBF, for which "No action", or only "flexible negative incentives" are prescribed if policy is to be guided by economic efficiency alone (see Fig. 4 ). Because of the consistently negative Public outcomes juxtaposed with highly positive Private results for plantation investors, it is not immediately apparent that an efficient, equitable and environmentally-friendly solution can be found.
In Fig. 6 , aggregate Private net benefits to new upstream plantations are plotted against aggregate downstream Public net benefits (UHS, IRR+S&D and WL). The greater negative impacts under the SALTY scenarios for the Public are due to the need for UHS to subsidise tree planting in MCUS for river salinity mitigation and, in that process, reduce river flows further while Private impacts for the tree plantations are strongly positive.
Large increases in tree-product values greatly magnify the Private incentives to plant trees, which induce considerable reductions in Public benefits. Finally in Fig. 6 , the effect of changing the Public's valuations of permanent losses of water flows to WL are shown. Assigning higher values per GL of reduced water flow to WL impacts only on the Public sense of lost net benefits; Private net benefits for new upstream plantations are unaffected. For $1.5M/GL, the loss in flow to WL more than doubles the apparent aggregate Public net losses, which could drive the public opinion from "No action (or flexible negative incentives)" toward simply "Negative incentives" for plantations; that is from area C to area D in Fig. 4 . When aggregated, however, the Public net benefits not only reveal nothing about the relative changes among downstream sectors, but suggest incorrectly that all will benefit equally in the FRESH compared to the SALTY Scenarios.
The "No Policy" case allows large quantities of water to be used for new tree plantations, benefiting only the businesses associated with those watersheds, while imposing losses of considerable magnitude on the downstream interests (Figs. 5, 6 and panels 1 and 2 in Fig. 7) . The "With Policy" scenario delivers something closer to a "win-win" for all the downstream Public sectors and the Private upstream tree plantations (panels 3 and 4 in Fig. 7) . Each sector is either better off, or no worse off than at present, as per Table 1 . There will be gains from trade where some downstream water entitlements, presently in low value uses, are sold to permit upstream plantations in locations where they can be more profitable as judged by those investing in trees and in the extra water required.
When the Public net benefits are disaggregated (as in Fig. 7) , it becomes clear that UHS is the only sector suffering a burden in both SALTY scenarios, without or with the policy, while bearing no burden in the FRESH scenarios, regardless of policy. UHS has secure annual allocations of water supply while the other sectors of Public benefit , on aggregate public net benefits and aggregate private net benefits. This example of Public-Private benefit analysis assumes no loss value for water flow reductions to wetlands. It also assumes Scenario 1 conditions; that is, FRESH flows from all watersheds and no requirement for new tree plantations to purchase water entitlements. Without protected water entitlements for the wetlands, large areas of new upstream plantations could take much of that water from its environmental use, as shown in Fig. 3 . (IRR+S&D and WL) are all negatively affected by expanded plantations in the cases without the policy, but positively affected or left unharmed by the policy that their water entitlements may be taken only if compensation by plantation owners is negotiated. Even UHS benefits from lower-cost salinity mitigation due to the smaller reduction in fresh river flows with the policy in force (see Table 1 ). Sizes of all policy and salinity scenario effects in Fig. 7 , negative and positive, are magnified by increased tree-product values.
In the "without policy" cases (Scenario Sets 1 and 2), outcomes for downstream IRR + S&D and WL sectors are clearly negative, that is fitting in sector C of Fig. 4 , which calls for "no action or flexibly negative incentives" for upstream plantations. Such flexible disincentives are provided by the policy considered in this paper, requiring new plantations to obtain water entitlements from downstream entitlement holders for the extra water the trees prevent from reaching the river.
The "with policy" case (Scenario Sets 3 and 4) reflects the new balances in water-use made possible by the policy. Less water would be taken by smaller areas of tree plantations, which are limited to those that are profitable even when paying for the extra water they use. With compensation to IRR+S&D by the market for water entitlements traded to upstream plantations, the results of the policy have shifted to area B in Fig. 4 , indicating a "win-win" outcome.
UHS suffers some loss under either policy setting when hypothetical MCUS conditions are very SALTY, in Scenario Sets 2 and 4. The importance of WL water losses in Scenario Sets 1 and 2, without the policy, would change in proportion to any increase in the $/GL value assigned to them, allowing for this matter of public concern to be expressed as nil, modest or strongly negative incentives to any new plantation investments. In Scenario Sets 3 and 4, with the policy, the assumption has been that water flows to the WL and associated ECR will be maintained at the initial levels, by allowing water entitlement trading only among downstream UHS and IRR + S&D sectors and upstream watershed sectors.
Discussion
Comparisons of "without" and "with policy" cases, combined with the FRESH and SALTY cases in four Scenario Sets (shown in Table 1 and plotted in Fig. 7) , are discussed below. In all scenarios, differences in equilibrium water distributions and economic impacts among the sectors are magnified strongly by increasing values of tree-products. Each of the following four sections discusses one of these four Scenario Sets.
Without policy requiring water entitlements for plantations, FRESH case (Scenario Set 1)
In this case, expansion of new plantation areas is limited only to the point at which marginal benefits to the planters exceed their direct and opportunity costs of taking land out of current uses to establish trees. They need not be concerned that expansion of tree plantations reduces stream flows to downstream parties, impacting negatively on the IRR + S&D sector and WL. Because river flows are FRESH and UHS has high-security water entitlements, this sector is not directly impacted by expansion of upstream plantations. For the purpose of this non-market scenario we assumed that reductions in water flows to IRR + S&D and the WL are proportional to their current shares of water-use, as is roughly the practice for allocations to general security water entitlements. With no limits on expansion of new tree plantations, we assume that any subsequent shortfalls in water availability are felt by all downstream sectors except UHS.
Without policy requiring water entitlements for plantations, SALTY case (Scenario Set 2)
As for the FRESH case, expansion of upstream tree plantations is expected to be limited only by planters' assessments of their own benefits and costs. However, negative impacts on downstream parties are increased due to extra costs imposed on UHS. MCUS, the SALTY watershed upstream of UHS, becomes an increasing threat to water quality when there are large reductions in FRESH dilution flows from upstream areas due to new tree plantations. The effect of further tree planting in MCUS, for salinity-mitigation benefiting only UHS and MCUS, is to reduce downstream river flows to the other sectors compared to those for the FRESH case.
With policy requiring water entitlements for plantations, FRESH case (Scenario Set 3)
Here, water supplies for UHS are guaranteed as in Scenario Set 1 and entitlements for WL are also assumed to be protected. Any new permanent water yield reductions by upstream plantations must be offset by entitlements purchased from the downstream IRR + S&D sectors. Though this will be far less profitable to planters than when water is free to them (Scenario Sets 1 and 2), it will still be quite profitable for the most productive plantation areas (high rainfall UC10 and UC8) to establish trees able to cover not only their direct and opportunity costs, but also the cost of purchasing permanent entitlements for the extra water that they are calculated to use.
With policy requiring water entitlements for plantations, SALTY case (Scenario Set 4)
Here, in comparison to Scenario Set 2, UHS faces lower costs for subsidising tree planting and the purchase of permanent water entitlements for the SALTY watershed (MCUS) to ensure adequate water quality. This is because the policy requiring water entitlements for new plantations results in smaller areas of plantations across the upper catchment, with much less reduction in fresh dilution flows, thus requiring a smaller area of new plantations in MCUS. The MCUS watershed is assumed to receive 600 mm annual rainfall and, as such, offers doubtful profitability for tree plantations in their own right. However, where trees can serve an important salinity-mitigation role (as where subsidised by those dependant on limited-salinity river water for human consumption) this becomes a viable option. Trees would be planted profitably in the SALTY watershed to the point where their direct and opportunity costs are met, plus the cost of permanent water entitlements appropriate to the extra water taken by tree plantations in this rainfall area given help from UHS in meeting these costs.
Further details in relation to FRESH Scenario Sets 1 and 3, where the 'No Policy' case of free water is contrasted to the 'with policy' case of negotiated purchase of water entitlements from IRR+S&D for new upstream tree plantations, are found in Fig. 3 . The detail in Fig. 3 is for all disaggregated sectors, except UHS, indicating new distributions of water-use, changes in economic surplus, and areas of new tree plantations under each of the four tree-product values in the FRESH catchment case. Until Fig. 7 in the present paper, results of salinity impacts on UHS had been given only in complex tabular formats by Nordblom et al. (2009) . Use of the PPBF in Fig. 7 facilitates the interpretation of all four Scenarios in ways most meaningful for policy. It illustrates the prospect of positive impacts across all sectors with a policy requiring new commercial tree plantations to obtain water entitlements for the extra water they use, from the downstream entitlement holders whose water flows will be diminished.
Caveats and further discussion
To keep this work tractable, we made a number of abstractions from reality. We have based our analysis on the assumptions of long-run average rainfalls and defined highly simplified representations of upstream and downstream structures and economies (i.e., six watersheds as sources of six tributaries to a single river flowing to five discrete sinks). In reality, rainfall is highly variable spatially and temporally in the Macquarie Catchment (Nordblom et al., 2012b) . The river's lower reaches are branched, braided, spreading and leaky; and the downstream sectors are intertwined and populated by people of diverse occupations and interests. Legislative, demographic and other boundaries do not always coincide with hydrological boundaries. In other words, this is a pretty typical region among those on the eastern border of the Murray Darling basin … each unique and complex.
In addition to simplifying the physical realities of weather, land use, and water flows, the market calculations used to derive the water distribution and price data plotted in this paper used the simplifying assumptions of perfect competition and perfect knowledge, without transaction costs, strategic behaviour or collusion. Such an ideal market would efficiently distribute water such that the price settles at the point where each buyer obtains the amount wanted, given the buyer's marginal value for a unit of water equals that of all others (amounts will differ among buyers), with sales and purchases clearing the limited fixed volume of available water entitlements. This will deliver water to the highest-value end uses. In reality, of course, knowledge is never perfect nor is competition pure or without transaction costs. Exact theoretical results rarely eventuate (Nordblom et al., 2011) .
Long-term average rainfalls, typical variations and climate change
Year-to-year variations in water yields from the watersheds comprise important uncertainties not dealt with in the present study. This could be balanced in subsequent analyses by explicitly accounting for uncertainties in rainfalls, river flows and prices, using state-contingent analysis (Quiggin and Chambers, 2006; Adamson et al., 2007 Adamson et al., , 2009 Mallawwaarachci et al., 2012; Crean et al., 2013) or similar means. Zhu et al. (2015) provide analytic results for integrated water management and transfers under stochastic surface water supplies. Though we can estimate the opportunity costs of reductions in economic water-use, we have offered no suggestions on how to assign a particular price or value to environmental water. Others have made important strides in that direction (Crase, 2012; Bennett, 2012; Dixon et al., 2012) .
The natural variations in watershed yields due to year-to-year variations in rainfall across the Macquarie catchment, bear little resemblance to the constant annual average flows we have assumed in the present analysis. In practice these variable seasonal watershed yields are flexibly distributed by a system of "water access entitlements" and "water allocations" within the entitlements (National Water Initiative, 2014).
Our simplifying assumptions that annual rainfalls are constant at the long-run average levels are supported only weakly by the moderating effects of large, water-storage structures (dams) such as those at Burrendong (1188 GL), Windamere (368 GL) and Oberon (45 GL), which collect the water of many tributaries of the upper and midMacquarie catchment (NSW State Water Corporation, 2015) . These serve to regulate the rivers, capturing storm waters, limiting both downstream floods and low flows, which otherwise damage agriculture and communities that depend on the river.
In the downstream parts of Macquarie catchment one finds citrus orchards and grape vineyards. Cotton is an important user of irrigation water; areas of this crop can expand widely or contract depending on water entitlements held and the abundance of water allocations from year to year. In years of low water availability, land use can switch to rainfed cropping or pasture production (Powell and Scott, 2011) . Where upstream plantations compensate downstream irrigators for reduced flows, this could partly subsidise improvement in the efficiency of their water infrastructure.
An important difference exists between uses of (a) actively managed irrigation water, for best use by many hundreds of farmers and regulated by water markets and different levels of industry and government, and (b) passive interception of rainwater by new forestry plantations and farm dams in the high-rainfall zones. In the latter, a tree plantation of pines or eucalypts is resilient; growing slower in the low-rainfall years and faster in the wet. Importantly, such plantations directly take their water at the sources of the rivers by intercepting rainfall and imbibing soil water as it infiltrates, reducing flows that sustain the streams. Locally, this can mean that many low-flow days become noflow days. Tree plantations in the high-rainfall watersheds will, therefore, passively have the first drink from the source with each rainfall event, outranking by priority location all other water users.
Exogenous prices for tree products
We assumed that one of four externally set prices for tree-products (stumpage values $40, $50, $60 and $70/m 3 ) holds across the watersheds and over time, though in reality, prices would shift with international and domestic supply and demand. We assumed simple costless application of a policy to extend the downstream water market to new upstream tree plantations, which previously had no institutional connection with a water market. In practice, such an institution could be challenging to administer. Among the questions to be answered are the appropriate exchange rates between passive continuous water consumption by tree plantations and the actively-adjusted and controlled water accessed for irrigation with pumps or gates (Nordblom et al., 2012b) . Is it one GL of entitlement for actively-adjusted use for one GL of entitlement for continuous passive use, as in the present study? Or is it two, three, four (or more) active for one passive? Water entitlements for new tree plantations could be deemed high-security in nature due to their passive and continuing use, in contrast to general-security water entitlements adjustable to varying availability of water, characterising the situation of all downstream sectors except UHS, which is assumed to have high-security entitlements of 27 GL/year. In the economic modelling behind the present study, marginal values of water use by new plantations were based on the expected price of tree products (recall Fig. 2) , as well as direct and opportunity costs of plantation establishment. Aggregation of these marginal values and ranking them from highest to lowest provided the demand curve for water use by new plantations in Nordblom et al. (2009) . This demand curve is assumed to be the only limit to expansion of plantations in the absence of a requirement to purchase water entitlements. In the presence of such a requirement, the limits of plantation expansion depend also on the aggregate water entitlement supply curve from IRR and S&D water users. This is simple competitive equilibrium in theory: the water price and quantities traded are simultaneously established where the supply and demand curves intersect.
In practice several forms of water market may co-exist as different forms of auctions, which allow the various sectors to interact, together comprising the wider equilibrium (Bardsley and Burfurd, 2013, p. 254) . These auctions for example could bridge (1) current water entitlement holders and wetlands managed by government; (2) current water entitlement holders and new tree plantations required to obtain water entitlements; and (3) UHS wishing to establish contracts with MCUS landholders to plant trees for river salinity mitigation.
Conclusions
Under the assumptions described in the present paper, the biophysical and economic inequities of unrestricted expansion of tree planting in the upper watersheds of the Macquarie River could be on the order $639M in gains to new plantations accompanied by $388M in uncompensated downstream losses to agricultural industries and diminished environmental assets. However, selecting the most appropriate policy to avoid such imbalances can lead to an impenetrable collection of trade-offs. Use of a Public-Private Benefit Framework (Pannell's, 2008 PPBF) allowed us to illustrate clearly how extending a downstream water market of economic players (irrigators and stock and domestic water users) to engage with prospective new upstream tree plantation investors, while the latter are required to purchase water entitlements from the former. This appears to offer an appropriate way to reach economically efficient, socially equitable and environmentally sustainable results, with all parties better off or at least unharmed.
A challenge in developing policy efficiently is to identify the best levels of aggregation or scale of the analysis. Greater aggregations (as in Fig. 2) , especially aggregation of sectors that directly compete for a vital resource, as do irrigation industries and large private tree plantations, while showing the overall impact of the policy, mask the impacts on key sectors. Conversely, a finely disaggregated analysis, such as presented in Fig. 3 , can be difficult to interpret as there are too many dimensions for a coherent focus. By comparison, the PPBF provides clear perspectives on the consequences of policy at several levels of aggregation (Fig. 7) .
The PPBF analysis indicated "flexible negative incentives" for upstream plantations using water when downstream sectors already hold entitlements to that water. We show that this flexibility extends as far as allowing a downstream urban sector to subsidise new tree plantations in a salty watershed for their own river salinity mitigation while paying for the extra water taken from other downstream water users. Flexibility is also present with the policy that new plantations may be established wherever they are deemed profitable by land owners individually in each watershed while paying for the extra water that they take from the system at prices agreeable to downstream entitlement holders. This is how the exogenous tree-product price is one of the determinants in a water market equilibrium solution for all its economic players. No regulatory quota is needed to set the areas of new plantations in advance for each watershed as the water market could solve the question most efficiently, and provide a mechanism for automatic adjustments over time. Regulatory constraints, such as to secure an agreed amount of water for environmental purposes, can be imposed to limit trading only to the remaining quantities.
